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The Court has asked the parties to address whether the particular procedural 
violations alleged by Thomas Robins (“Robins”) entail a degree of risk sufficient 
to meet the concreteness requirement for Article III standing. The answer is “yes”: 
Robins alleges that Spokeo, Inc. (“Spokeo”) committed significant and repeated 
violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s (“FCRA”) procedural requirements 
that led to dissemination of inaccurate information about important aspects of his 
profile, including his age, educational background, employment history, wealth 
level, and marital status. These allegations, which go to the heart of the concern 
that motivated Congress to enact the FCRA, easily meet Article III’s concreteness 
requirement. The Court also asked whether any other issues remain outstanding in 
this appeal and what action this court should take with respect thereto. The answer 
to that question is “no.” Accordingly, Appellant respectfully requests that the Court 
reverse the judgment of the district court dismissing this action and remand the 
case for further proceedings. 
BACKGROUND 
I. The Complaint 
The FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., imposes “a comprehensive series of 
restrictions on the disclosure and use of credit information assembled by consumer 
reporting agencies.” FTC v. Manager, Retail Credit Co., 515 F.2d 988, 989 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975). Robins alleges that Spokeo violated Section 1681e(b), which required 
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the consumer reporting agency to “follow reasonable procedures to assure 
maximum possible accuracy” when it prepared a report about him. Plausibly 
alleging that Spokeo violated this provision, Robins brought this action under 
Section 1681n, which authorizes a private suit by a consumer against “[a]ny person 
who willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter 
with respect to [that] consumer.”1 
“In order to make out a prima facie violation under § 1681e(b), a consumer 
must present evidence tending to show that a credit reporting agency prepared a 
report containing inaccurate information.” Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. 
Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance 
Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 1991)). Robins alleged that Spokeo falsely 
reported his educational background, his employment history, his wealth level, and 
his marital status, while also publishing a photograph of somebody else under 
Robins’s name. ER40:8 ¶¶ 31-32. Robins further alleged that when Spokeo created 
                                                
1  Robins’s complaint also alleged violations of other FCRA requirements, 
including that Spokeo failed to provide required notices to various furnishers and 
users of its information, and that it failed to provide a required toll-free number 
that consumers can call to request free copies of their credit reports. ER40:12 ¶¶ 
61-74 (relying on 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e(d)(1)(A), (B); 1681b(b); 1681j(a)(1)(C)(i)). 
But Robins does not pursue these “claims” as independent bases for relief. While 
inartfully styled as “claims,” these allegations are merely examples of Spokeo’s 
willful failure to use reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy 
in its published reports. Because Robins alleges a single claim for relief under 
Section 1681e(b), the question of whether such allegations would be independently 
sufficient to establish Article III injury is not presented.   
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the report, it was aware of rampant inadequacies in its processes, was aware of its 
consistent failure to follow the procedures the FCRA requires, and, as a result, had 
willfully violated the FCRA. ER40:5 ¶22–6 ¶25, ER40:13 ¶ 64.  
II. The Supreme Court’s Decision 
The district court dismissed Robin’s action for lack of Article III standing. 
This Court reversed. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409 (2014). This Court held 
that Robins’s allegations regarding Spokeo’s willful failure to follow reasonable 
procedures established injury in fact because Robins alleged that Spokeo had 
“violated his statutory rights, not just the statutory rights of other people,” id. at 
413, and the “interests protected by the statutory rights at issue are sufficiently 
concrete and particularized that Congress can elevate them,” id. (citing Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)). 
The Supreme Court vacated this Court’s judgment. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 
136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). The Court reiterated that Article III requires the plaintiff to 
show he has “suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete 
and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id. 
at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (1992)). Though the Supreme Court took 
no issue with this Court’s determination that Robins had alleged a “particularized” 
violation of his FCRA rights, it concluded that this Court’s ruling had “elided” 
Article III’s independent “concreteness” requirement. Id.  
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For an injury to be concrete, the Court explained, it must be “‘real,’ and not 
‘abstract.’” Id. (citations omitted). But an injury can be “real” even if it is not 
“‘tangible.’” Id. at 1549. “In determining whether an intangible harm,” such as one 
that may result from the violation of federal statute, “constitutes injury in fact, both 
history and the judgment of Congress play important roles.” Id.  The Court 
affirmed that “Congress is well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet 
minimum Article III requirements,” id., and has the power to “define injuries and 
articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where 
none existed before,” id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment)). Likewise, “[b]ecause the doctrine of 
standing derives from the case-or-controversy requirement, and because that 
requirement in turn is grounded in historical practice, it is instructive to consider 
whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has 
traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or 
American courts.” Id. (citing Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. 
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 775-77 (2000)). 
On the other hand, a plaintiff does not “automatically satisf[y] the injury-in-
fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports 
to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.” Id. “Robins could not,” the 
Court explained, “allege a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete 
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harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.” Id. (citing Summers 
v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572). There 
must be at least “the risk of real harm” to the interest protected by Congress to 
“satisfy the requirement of concreteness.” Id. (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 
133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013)). But the Court was clear that “the violation of a procedural 
right granted by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury 
in fact” and, in those circumstances when it is, a plaintiff “need not allege any 
additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.” Id. at 1549-50 (citing 
FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20-25 (1998); Public Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 
U.S. 440, 449 (1989)). 
Applied to the case at bar, the Court held that Congress, through the FCRA, 
“plainly sought to curb the dissemination of false information by adopting 
procedures designed to decrease that risk.” Id. at 1550. Yet it also recognized that a 
procedural violation may not result in a concrete injury because “[a] violation of 
one of the FCRA’s procedural requirements may result in no harm.” Id. That might 
be the case, the Court suggested, if Spokeo’s poor procedures had not actually led 
to any inaccuracy, or if the flawed information published as a result of Spokeo’s 
poor procedures did not involve the “types of false information” (like a wrong zip 
code) that could “cause harm or present any material risk of harm” to consumers. 
Id. & n.8. 
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Justice Thomas joined the Court’s opinion in full but wrote separately to 
explain why the ruling remained faithful to Article III’s common-law tradition. 
The Court’s decision, he wrote, adhered to the traditional distinction between 
public and private rights that “persist[ed] in modern standing doctrine.” Id. at 
1553-54 (Thomas, J., concurring). “Historically, common-law courts possessed 
broad power to adjudicate suits involving the alleged violation of private rights”—
that is, “rights belonging to individuals, considered as individuals”—“even when 
plaintiffs alleged only the violation of those rights and nothing more.” Id. at 1551 
(citation omitted). “Common-law courts, however, have required a further showing 
of injury for violation of public rights—rights that involve duties owed to the 
whole community, considered as a community, in its social aggregate capacity.” 
Id. (citation and quotations omitted). In such common-law disputes, Justice 
Thomas explained, the plaintiff needed to “allege ‘special damage’” before “the 
suit could proceed.” Id. at 1551-52. 
Hewing to that tradition, Article III does not require a “plaintiff seeking to 
vindicate a statutorily created private right” to “allege actual harm beyond the 
invasion of that private right.” Id. at 1553 (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 
455 U.S. 363, 373-74 (1982); Tenn. Valley Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 
137-38 (1939)). But Article III requires more when the suit involves a public right. 
See id. (“Congress cannot authorize private plaintiffs to enforce public rights in 
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their own names, absent some showing that the plaintiff has suffered a concrete 
harm particular to him.”). Justice Thomas agreed that remand was the appropriate 
course because while some of Robins’s allegations invoked public rights, “one 
claim in Robins’ complaint rests on a statutory provision that could arguably 
establish a private cause of action to vindicate the violation of a privately held 
right.” Id. Thus, if the FCRA “has created a private duty owed personally to 
Robins to protect his information, then the violation of the legal duty suffices for 
Article III injury in fact.” Id. at 1554. 
Justice Ginsburg, writing for herself and Justice Sotomayor, “agree[d] with 
much of the Court’s opinion,” but dissented because she did not see “the necessity 
of a remand to determine whether Robins’ particularized injury was ‘concrete’” 
because “Robins’ allegations carry him across the threshold.” Id. at 1554-55 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). “Robins complains of misinformation about his 
education, family situation, and economic status, inaccurate representations that 
could affect his fortune in the job market.” Id. at 1556. In her view, “[t]he FCRA’s 
procedural requirements aimed to prevent such harm.” Id. (citing 115 Cong. Rec. 
2410-2415 (1969)). 
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ARGUMENT 
The particular procedural violations alleged in this case entail a degree of 
risk sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement. “The FCRA seeks to ensure 
‘fair and accurate credit reporting.’” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1545 (quoting 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681(a)(1)). It does so, in part, by providing that “[w]henever a consumer 
reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures 
to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual 
about whom the report relates.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). Any consumer reporting 
agency that “fails to comply with” this requirement “with respect to any consumer 
is liable to that consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a). Whether the FCRA is analyzed 
as a matter of legislative judgment, under the common law, or both, Congress’s 
decision “to curb the dissemination of false information by adopting procedures 
designed to decrease that risk,” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550, satisfies the 
concreteness requirement of Article III. 
Nor does Spokeo have any other legitimate basis for contesting Robins’s 
Article III standing. Robins has alleged that the inaccuracies in his credit report are 
traceable to Spokeo’s willful failure to comply with the FCRA’s procedural duties. 
And, the statutory damages to which Robins is entitled if he prevails in this action 
provide a judicial remedy. Accordingly, Article III is no obstacle to hearing this 
dispute in federal court. 
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Finally, there are no other issues for this Court to resolve. Although Spokeo 
unsuccessfully asserted additional reasons for dismissal in the district court, it did 
not raise those arguments as alternative grounds for affirmance in the initial appeal 
to this Court. Those arguments were forfeited. The fact this case is on remand from 
the Supreme Court changes nothing. The Court should reverse the district court’s 
judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.     
I. The Procedural Violations Robins Alleges Entail a Degree of Risk to 
Congress’s Interest in Fair and Accurate Credit Reports Sufficient to 
Meet the Concreteness Requirement. 
 
 The Supreme Court established a two-part framework for assessing whether 
Spokeo’s violation of the FCRA has caused Robins concrete harm. First, this Court 
must determine whether the “intangible” interest to which Congress gave statutory 
protection is concrete. In fashioning this inquiry, the Court expressly rejected 
Spokeo’s argument that concreteness turns on whether the statutory violation 
causes a resultant real-world harm. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548; see also Church v. 
Accretive Health, Inc, No. 15-15708, 2016 WL 3611543, at *2 (11th Cir. July 6, 
2016) (recognizing Spokeo held “that an injury need not be tangible to be 
concrete”). Rather, that inquiry turns (as it always has) on whether the “legally 
protected interest,” i.e., the statutory right, is concrete. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 
(emphasis added) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560); see, e.g., In re Nickelodeon 
Consumer Privacy Litig., --- F.3d ---, No. 15-1441, 2016 WL 3513782, at *7 (3d 
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Cir. June 27, 2016) (analyzing Spokeo and concluding that “[w]hile perhaps 
‘intangible,’ the harm” at issue “is also concrete in the sense that it involves a clear 
de facto injury, i.e., the unlawful disclosure of legally protected information”). 
Here, the FCRA protects a consumer’s concrete interest in an accurate credit report 
about himself or herself. 
 Second, because the FCRA imposes a procedural obligation, the Court must 
ensure that Robins has not alleged “a bare procedural violation” that is “divorced” 
from the substantive interest Congress protected. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. In 
answering that question, the focus must be on both the nature of the “procedural 
violation” and the “types of false information” alleged. Id. at 1550 & n.8. Here, 
Robins has suffered concrete harm because he alleges that Spokeo committed 
rampant and persistent procedural violations that led to the dissemination of the 
types of false information about him that create a “material risk of harm” to the 
interest the FCRA protects. Id. at 1550. No more is required to establish injury in 
fact under Article III. 
 Last, the Court explained that this inquiry is especially easy if the statute 
“has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing 
a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.” Id. at 1549 (citing Vt. Agency 
of Nat. Res., 529 U.S. at 775-77). That is the case here. The interest protected by 
Congress is a direct descendant of the interests guarded by the traditional torts of 
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libel and slander in one’s profession, each of which was actionable per se at 
common law. Indeed, until the FCRA, inaccuracies in credit reports could be 
remedied, if at all, through an action for defamation under state law. Because the 
FCRA protects an intangible interest with a “close relationship” to a harm that, 
historically, authorized a suit at common law, the statutory interest is concrete for 
purposes of Article III. 
A. Congress’s judgment that the dissemination of false credit reports 
harms the subjects of those reports establishes that Robins alleges 
a concrete injury. 
 
Congress, on the basis of an exhaustive record, concluded that inaccurate 
credit reports caused significant harm both individually and in the aggregate. 
Individuals, for instance, experienced diminished job prospects and could have 
difficulty securing private financing; in the aggregate, widespread inaccuracies 
significantly disrupted credit markets. Judging the problem to be both severe and 
solvable, Congress, through the FCRA, adopted a series of reforms designed to 
reduce such inaccuracies to the maximum extent feasible and to hold consumer 
reporting agencies responsible. Specifically, the statute holds those agencies that 
fail to follow proper procedures liable to those consumers about whom they 
disseminate false information.  
Congress has created a concrete statutory right. Accordingly, the plaintiff 
“need not allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.” 
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Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549-50; see id. at 1553 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“A 
plaintiff seeking to vindicate a statutorily create private right need not allege actual 
harm beyond the invasion of that private right.”). As the Eleventh Circuit just 
recently reiterated, it is settled law that “[a]n injury-in-fact, as required by Article 
III, ‘may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of 
which creates standing.’” Church, 2016 WL 3611542, at *3 (quoting Havens 
Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 373). 
Further, Robins does not allege a bare procedural violation divorced from 
the harm to which the FCRA responds. Robins alleges that Spokeo committed 
serial procedural violations and that it published inaccurate information about, 
among other things, his age, family status, employment history, financial status, 
and educational attainment. These categories of false information are similar in 
type to information that numerous investigative studies have found is pervasively 
inaccurate on Spokeo.com. And while Spokeo is aware of these inaccuracies, it 
persists in creating and marketing reports about individuals. In short, “[t]he facts 
that Robins pled make it plausible that Spokeo acted in reckless disregard of duties 
created by the FCRA.” Robins, 742 F.3d at 411 n.1. It is beyond doubt, then, that 
the harm resulting from the procedural violations alleged here is directly tethered 
to the underlying interest protected by the FCRA. 
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1. Congress enacted the FCRA to curb the dissemination of 
false credit reports. 
 
The FCRA’s passage was preceded by decades of concern over inadequate 
protections against false statements regarding an individual’s creditworthiness. 
Historically, the dissemination of a false credit report could be redressed through a 
common-law defamation action. See infra at I.B. By the early twentieth century, 
though, most American jurisdictions had adopted a “qualified privilege” for 
consumer reporting agencies accused of defamation. See Virginia G. Maurer, 
Common Law Defamation and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 72 Geo. L.J. 95, 100 
(1983). The effect of this privilege was to “place the burden of proving actual 
malice and actual damages on the plaintiff.” Id. As a consequence, by the mid-
twentieth century an individual who was “the subject of a credit report [was] all 
but unprotected in most jurisdictions.” 115 Cong. Rec. 2414 (1969).  
The vulnerability of consumers to false credit reports became a national 
concern in the wake of World War II when “a vast credit reporting industry . . .  
developed to supply credit information.” S. Rep. No. 91-517, at 2 (1969). Credit 
bureaus, aided by “the growth of computer technology,” began to supply 
information on millions of individuals’ “financial status, bill paying record and 
items of public record such as arrests, suits, judgments,” as well as “information on 
a person’s character, habits, and morals,” and “highly sensitive and personal 
information about a person’s private life, such as racial or ethnic descent, domestic 
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trouble, housekeeping habits, and conditions of yard.” Id. at 2, 4. By the 1960s, 
there was a consensus in Congress that the States had failed to adapt their 
regulatory approach to the modern credit industry. Because “unfair credit reporting 
methods undermine the public confidence which is essential to the continued 
functioning of the banking system,” Congress felt it needed to step in order “to 
insure that consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with 
fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer’s right to privacy.” 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1681(a)(1), (a)(4). 
The FCRA was Congress’s measured response. At the behest of the credit 
industry, the FCRA preempted most state-law claims by prohibiting “any action or 
proceeding in the nature of defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence with 
respect to the reporting of information against any consumer reporting agency … 
based on information disclosed pursuant to [the FCRA], except as to false 
information furnished with malice or willful intent to injure such consumer.” Id. 
§ 1681h(a); id. § 1681t(a) (preempting any law “inconsistent with any provision of 
this title”); S. Rep. No. 91-517, at 3 (1969) (noting that credit agencies facing the 
possibility of new regulations in 29 states “expressed a preference for Federal 
regulation rather than State legislation”). Congress also declined to make consumer 
reporting agencies strictly liable for the dissemination of false credit reports—as it 
could have done. See S. Rep. No. 104-185, at 43 (1995).  
  Case: 11-56843, 07/11/2016, ID: 10046531, DktEntry: 76, Page 21 of 37
  15 
Congress instead “federalized and transformed” “common law defamation in 
the credit reporting context . . . into an action for negligence.” Maurer, supra, at 
115. Congress did so by training its focus on the procedures consumer reporting 
agencies used to ensure accuracy of the reports they disseminate. Specifically, the 
FCRA protects the consumer’s interest in an accurate credit report by making 
“consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs 
of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a 
manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the 
confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information.” 
15 U.S.C. § 1681(b). Congress recognized that “the consumer reporting system 
handles almost two billion pieces of data per month and will never be perfectly 
accurate.” S. Rep. No. 104-185, at 43. Requiring consumer reporting agencies to 
adopt certain prophylactic and corrective measures designed to limit inaccuracies 
to the extent possible would appropriately “balance the rights of consumers with 
those of consumer reporting agencies[.]” Id. at 49.  
To that end, the FCRA makes a consumer reporting agency that is “negligent 
in failing to comply with any requirement imposed under [the act] with respect to 
any consumer . . . liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the sum of any 
actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure[.]” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681o(a). And it makes a consumer reporting agency that “willfully fails to 
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comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to any 
consumer is liable to that consumer” for “any actual damages sustained by the 
consumer as a result of the failure or damages of not less than $100 and not more 
than $1,000.” Id. § 1681n(a)(1)(A). In other words, Congress distinguished 
between those consumer reporting agencies that acted negligently and those that 
acted willfully—making enhanced statutory remedies available only with respect 
to the latter. 
Indeed, Congress’s decision to allow for statutory damages was the result of 
careful deliberation. Before the FCRA allowed statutory damages, the law did “not 
always serve as a viable remedy.” Lawrence D. Frenzel, Fair Credit Reporting 
Act: The Case for Revision, 10 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 409, 429 (1977). “Civil actions 
brought pursuant to the [FCRA] tend[ed] to result in nominal—if any—damages to 
the consumer-plaintiff.” Id. at 429-30. Accordingly, there was “little incentive on 
the part of the consumer to bring an action under the statute, and as a result, 
reporting agencies [felt] no real compulsion to comply with the protective 
mechanisms of the Act.” Id. at 430. There were numerous calls to amend the 
FCRA to “provid[e] for minimum liability or presumed damages when a violation 
is proven.” Robert R. Stauffer, Note, Tenant Blacklisting: Tenant Screening 
Services and the Right to Privacy, 24 Harv. J. on Legis. 239, 311 (1987); see also 
Consumer Information: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the 
  Case: 11-56843, 07/11/2016, ID: 10046531, DktEntry: 76, Page 23 of 37
  17 
Comm. on Banking, Currency, and Hous., 94th Cong., 6, 79, 105-06 (1975). 
Congress thus responded to “horror stories about inaccurate credit information and 
the inability of consumers to get the information corrected,” 141 Cong. Rec. 
10,916 (1995), by amending the FCRA to allow victims of willful violations to 
recover statutory damages. Congress understood that although harm was almost 
certain to occur from willful violations of the FCRA, it was “very difficult to 
prove.” Consumer Information, supra, at 6. 
In the end, Congress was “aware of concerns expressed by furnishers of 
information and the consumer reporting agencies that these provisions will result in 
unwarranted litigation,” but believed this step was necessary to protect “consumers 
who have been wronged.” S. Rep. No. 104-185, at 49. That was Congress’s choice 
to make. See, e.g., Church, 2016 WL 3611542, at *3 (recognizing that Congress 
may create “a new right” and thus “a new injury”). Congress did all that Article III 
requires of it. Congress “related the injury” (i.e., invasion of a consumer’s legal 
right to accurate information in his credit report) “to the class of persons entitled to 
bring suit” (i.e., those individuals whose inaccurate reports are the product of the 
consumer reporting agency’s failure to follow reasonable procedures). Lujan, 504 
U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
Congress’s “judgment is . . . instructive and important” and, accordingly, is entitled 
to judicial respect. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.   
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2. Robins has not alleged a bare procedural violation divorced 
from the FCRA’s interest in curbing the dissemination of 
false credit reports. 
 
Robins is not “alleging a bare procedural violation.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 
1550. His complaint alleges Spokeo systematically failed to use reasonable 
procedures, and that its failure to do so when preparing his report rendered his 
profile inaccurate in important respects. “Robins pled, among other things, that 
Spokeo knew about inaccuracies in its reports and marketed its reports for 
purposes covered by the FCRA despite disclaiming any such uses.” Robins, 742 
F.3d at 411 n.1. Indeed, “Spokeo’s founder—Harrison Tang—gave a statement 
regarding purported inaccuracies in [the agency’s] consumer reports. According to 
Tang, ‘We know there are a lot of things we need to improve. There are algorithms 
we can do that we haven’t had time to improve the inaccuracies. There’s a lot of 
holes. We know that and we admit that.’” ER40:6 ¶ 23. 
In addition, “Spokeo has failed to develop an effective system to allow 
consumers to remove inaccurate information from their individual reports, or 
remove the reports from Defendant's website altogether.” Id. ¶ 24. For example, 
“while [Spokeo] purports to allow individuals to remove their Spokeo listings, 
Spokeo intentionally limits removal requests based on unspecified or nonexistent 
criteria. Specifically, Spokeo frequently responds to individuals who attempt to 
remove information that: ‘In order to prevent abuse, we must limit the frequency of 
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privacy requests. Please try again tomorrow. Government officials please use your 
@.gov email address for priority processing.” Id. Even when successfully 
removed, an inaccurate report can reappear. ER40-1:26 ¶ 33 (Exh. G to FAC). In 
sum, “the facts that Robins pled make it plausible that Spokeo acted in reckless 
disregard of duties created by the FCRA.” Robins, 742 F.3d at 411 n.1. 
Moreover, Robins does not allege that these rampant procedural violations, 
led, for example, merely to trivial inaccuracies. Quite the contrary, the “types of 
false information” alleged here, Spokeo, 136 S. Ct at 1550 n.8, create a “risk of real 
harm” to the subjects of credit reports, id. at 1549. Again, Robins alleged that 
Spokeo disseminated a false report about him that misrepresented his age, marital 
status, earnings history, employment circumstances, and physical appearance. 
Inaccuracies in these categories of information creates a substantial risk that his 
employment prospects will be negatively affected. Employers may decide not to 
pursue a candidate they believe is overqualified, has a high salary expectation, or 
may have family commitments preventing the candidate from accepting the 
relevant responsibilities; nor may they be inclined to pursue candidates whose 
reports vary from the (accurate) information the applicant might himself provide 
the employer. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1556 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Spokeo’s 
misrepresentation of Robins’s marital status also creates a real risk of harm, 
especially given Spokeo’s promotion of its service for use by prospective romantic 
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partners. 136 S. Ct. at 1546; see Vanessa Flores Waite, When Your Gut Feeling 
Says He’s Married, Spokeo Blog, http://www.spokeo.com/blog/2016/07/when-
your-gut-feeling-says-hes-married (July 7, 2016). 
“The FCRA’s procedural requirements aimed to prevent such harm.” 
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1556 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing 115 Cong. Rec. 2410–
2415 (1969)). The FCRA responded to the “horror stories about inaccurate credit 
information and the inability of consumers to get the information corrected.” 141 
Cong. Rec. 10,916. Congress recognized that agencies “frequently confuse[d] one 
individual with another” and reproduced “[b]iased information” and “malicious 
gossip and hearsay.” 115 Cong. Rec. at 2411. Put differently, the types of 
inaccuracies at issue in this case create a “material risk of harm” to the interests the 
FCRA protects and typify the “chain[] of causation” Congress had in mind when it 
enacted the statute. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (citation omitted). The harm Robins 
alleges is therefore concrete. 
B. The FCRA’s protection against the dissemination of false credit 
reports follows from the common law.  
History, too, is on Robins’s side. As noted above, it “is instructive to 
consider whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that 
has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or 
American courts.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. Indeed, it can be “well nigh 
conclusive with respect” to the Article III inquiry. Vt. Agency of Natural 
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Resources, 529 U.S. at 777. Here, a “close relationship” exists between the 
dissemination of false credit reports and common-law defamation. Long before the 
FCRA, a common-law defamation action could be brought against a credit agency 
for disseminating false information. See Maurer, supra, at 97; William T. Prosser, 
Libel Per Quod, 46 Va. L. Rev. 839, 842-43 (1960). That close relationship is 
sufficient to resolve the Article III question. See, e.g., Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. 
APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 273-85 (2008). 
Defamation has a long common-law lineage. See Van Vechten Veeder, 
History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 Colum. L. Rev. 546, 549-69 
(1903). Two species of defamation law are particularly relevant here: written 
defamation (or libel), and slander of an individual in his profession. Originally, one 
key limitation on the ability of a plaintiff to recover in an action for defamation 
was the requirement that the plaintiff prove a “temporal loss,” or actual damages, 
arising from the disparaging statement. See, e.g., Bernard v. Beale, (1617) 79 Eng. 
Rep. 1241 (K.B.).  
Over time, however, the common law developed such that, for some 
defamation claims, harm was presumed even in the absence of proof. Harm was 
presumed, for instance, for claims of slander that “touch[ed]” the plaintiff “in his 
profession.” Jenkins v. Smith, (1620) 79 Eng. Rep. 501 (K.B.). And once English 
common law courts began to distinguish between written and spoken defamation, 
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“all libel, of whatever kind, was held to be actionable without proof of any 
damage; or, as it was sometimes stated, from any libel some damage was 
conclusively presumed.” Prosser, Libel, supra, at 842 (emphasis added); see, e.g., 
R v. Langley, (1702) 90 Eng. Rep. 1261 (K.B.). By 1812, the distinction permitting 
recovery for any libel had “been recognized by the Courts for at least a century 
back.” Thorley v. Lord Kerry, (1812) 128 Eng. Rep. 367, 371 (K.B.). 
These common-law rules—permitting courts to hear claims for all libel, as 
well as for any defamation touching upon trade or business, without proof of 
consequential harm—were adopted in America as well. Blackstone noted, for 
example, that for certain categories of slander, including “scandalous words that  
. . . may impair [a man’s] trade . . . an action may be had, without proving any 
particular damage to have happened, but merely upon the probability that it might 
happen.” Blackstone, 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England *124; see 2 Kent, Commentaries on American Law 16 (1827). Early 
American decisions thus applied the English common-law rule that general 
damages were permissible for any statement that touched upon the trade or credit 
of those engaged in business. See Hermann v. Bradstreet Co., 19 Mo. App. 227, 
232 (1885); Lansing v. Carpenter, 9 Wis. 540, 542 (1859); Newbold v. J.M. 
Bradstreet & Son, 57 Md. 38, 52-53 (1881); Dun v. Maier, 82 F. 169, 173 (5th Cir. 
1897). A showing of consequential harm was unnecessary because this kind of 
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false statement “necessarily or naturally and presumptively causes pecuniary loss 
to the person of whom it is published.” Mitchell v. Bradstreet Co., 22 S.W. 358, 
362 (Mo. 1893). Early American courts also evidenced widespread acceptance of 
the established principle that general damages, without proof of consequential 
harm, were available in all libel cases. See Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U.S. 225, 228 
(1875) (“[M]any things are actionable when written or printed and published which 
would not be actionable if merely spoken, without averring and proving special 
damage.”); see, e.g., Runkle v. Meyer, 3 Yeates 518 (Pa. 1803); McClurg v. Ross, 5 
Binn. 218 (Pa. 1812); Norfolk & Wash. Steamboat Co. v. Davis, 12 App. D.C. 306, 
331-32 (D.C. Cir. 1898). 
In sum, Anglo-American common law has long permitted claims by those 
who, like Robins, were the subject of false and defamatory reports, particularly 
reports that had the potential to harm their standing, credit, trade, or business. Such 
claims were actionable absent “evidence of actual loss,” Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974), because the “experience and judgment of history” 
is “‘that proof of actual damage will be impossible in a great many [defamation] 
cases’” even though “‘it is all but certain that serious harm has resulted in fact.’” 
Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 760 (1985) (quoting W. 
Prosser, Law of Torts § 112 (4th ed. 1971)). Hence, “the existence of injury is 
presumed from the fact of publication.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349. 
  Case: 11-56843, 07/11/2016, ID: 10046531, DktEntry: 76, Page 30 of 37
  24 
The FCRA follows directly from this common-law tradition. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court recognized that “the law has long permitted recovery by certain tort 
victims,” including victims of “libel” and “slander per se,” “even if their harms 
may be difficult to prove or measure.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (citing 
Restatement (First) of Torts §§ 569, 570 (1938)). That is what the FCRA does. It 
allows the subject of a credit report to recover when a consumer reporting agency 
disseminates false information about him. Like the common law, the FCRA makes 
such false dissemination actionable because it is likely to “deter third persons from 
associating or dealing with him,” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559, even if “no 
proof that serious harm has resulted from the defendant’s attack upon the 
plaintiff’s character and reputation,” id. § 620 cmt. a. By making this intangible 
harm actionable, the FCRA is “consonant with what was, generally speaking, the 
business of the Colonial courts and the courts of Westminster when the 
Constitution was framed.” Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 
123, 150 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).2 
                                                
2  Congress’s decision to afford certain victims of false credit reports statutory 
damages has additional historical support. See Theodore Sedgwick, A Treatise on 
the Measure of Damages 571 (1847) (describing the “large class of cases” where 
legislatures “endeavored to put a stop to all inquiry into the actual damages by 
fixing an arbitrary sum as the measure of relief”). In 1790, for example, the First 
Congress required copyright infringers to “pay the sum of fifty cents for every 
sheet,” half to the owner and half to the government; no proof of actual loss was 
required. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 2, 1 Stat. 124, 124-125. 
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But even if the FCRA deviates from the common law in some way, there is a 
sufficiently “close relationship” to satisfy the concreteness requirement. Spokeo, 
136 S. Ct. at 1549. After all, the Article III question is not whether Robins could 
have successfully sued Spokeo for defamation in the late eighteenth century, but 
whether the FCRA authorizes an action “of the sort traditionally amenable to, and 
resolved by, the judicial process.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 
U.S. 83, 102 (1998) (emphasis added) (citing Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 
346, 356-57 (1911)). If “Congress can create new private rights and authorize 
private plaintiffs to sue based simply on violation of those new legal rights,” 
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1552 (Thomas, J., concurring), it certainly has the power to 
update the common law to the modern era. Congress is not so constrained that it 
may protect rights derived from the common law only when it accepts them in 
their fossilized form. Whether or not the FCRA perfectly “duplicate[s] the 
recovery at common law” it provides “a reasonably just substitute for the common-
law or state tort law remedies it” partially “replaces.” Duke Power Co. v. Carolina 
Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 87-88 (1978).    
II. Robins meets the other requirements of Article III standing. 
Because Robins has suffered injury in fact, he has Article III standing. 
Neither the Supreme Court nor Spokeo has questioned that the injury alleged by 
Robins “is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant” and “will be 
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redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. 
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000). And for good reason. Robins, 742 F.3d 
at 414. As to traceability, Robins need not “establish”—let alone plead—“with any 
certainty” that the credit report created about him would have been accurate had 
Spokeo followed proper procedures. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7; see Massachusetts 
v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007) (“A [litigant] who alleges a deprivation of a 
procedural protection to which he is entitled never has to prove that if he had 
received the procedure the substantive result would have been altered.”) (citations 
and quotations omitted). Instead, Robins need only allege that the missing 
“procedural step was connected to the substantive result.” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 
at 518. As explained above, he has. And as to redressability, the FCRA affords 
Robins statutory damages, “which redress the violation of statutory rights.” Robins, 
742 F.3d at 414.  
III. There Are No Other Issues Before This Court. 
In the district court, Spokeo pressed for dismissal on the additional ground 
that Robins failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. ER22:15. In 
particular, Spokeo argued that it is not a “consumer reporting agency” within the 
meaning of the FCRA and that it is immune under the Communications Decency 
Act. ER22:15, 21. The district court rejected both arguments. ER52:4-5. On 
appeal, the parties litigated only the issue of Robins’s Article III standing; Spokeo 
  Case: 11-56843, 07/11/2016, ID: 10046531, DktEntry: 76, Page 33 of 37
  27 
declined to defend the judgment on alternative grounds. Robins, 742 F.3d at 414 
n.4 (noting that “standing is the only question before us”).  
Thus, no issues beyond whether Robins suffered a concrete injury in fact are 
before this Court on remand. It was Spokeo’s duty to raise these arguments in 
defense of the district court’s judgment. Its failure to do so renders them forfeited. 
See, e.g., City of Thousand Oaks v. Verizon Media Ventures, Inc., 69 F. App’x 826, 
828 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Appellees waived their argument that the transaction violated 
section 4.2 by failing to raise it as an alternative ground for affirmance in their 
opening brief on appeal.”) (citing United States v. Alexander, 287 F.3d 811, 817 
n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)). Nor does the fact that the case is on remand from the Supreme 
Court afford Spokeo a second bite at the apple. See Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 820 F.3d 
1041, 1049 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Nw. Ind. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 872 F.2d 465, 470 
(D.C. Cir. 1989)). 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the 
case for further proceedings. 
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